Chapter 7
The Prerequisites of Patronage

The Meaning of Party

In Pertosa we must be careful how we handle the term 'party'. As Duverger has remarked, the word is used to describe 'the factions which divided the Republics of Antiquity...the committees which prepared elections under the property franchise of the constitutional monarchies, as well as the vast popular organisations which give shape to public opinion in modern democracies'.[1] In 'Politics as a Vocation', Max Weber makes a similar point when he distinguishes three stages in the development of political parties in Europe. The aristocratic cliques of the early nineteenth century were succeeded by parties of notables, which in turn gave way to the party machine of plebicitarian democracy.[2] In both cases the only thing that these three institutions have in common is that each seeks to win and exercise political power.

Nowadays, the main characteristic of the party is that it is organised on bureaucratic principles. It appoints large numbers of permanent officials whose duties are not simply confined to electoral activity, but who must also provide for the political education of members. Internal struggles for leadership are not expressed in terms of rivalries between personalities, but as conflict of opinion over issues of policy and doctrine. Officially, the structure of all the main Italian parties corresponds to this description. In practice, at the local level, it is inappropriate. Although contestants for leadership sometimes claim that their differences have an ideological basis, it is generally believed that this is merely a mask of respectability which conceals personal ambitions and family rivalries. The authority of party secretaries themselves is often conditional on the approval of local notables.[3]

This last point was made in an article which appeared in *Unità*, the Communist newspaper, on the eve of the communal elections in Pertosa. Under the title '*Per battere la lista di Don Antonio*' (How to defeat Don Antonio's list) the local correspondent maintained that the Christian Democratic list had been chosen by a powerful landlord who was not even a member of the party.[4] In a similar vein, a former DC secretary told me that

he had been compelled to resign because he had refused to carry out the orders of the same Don Antonio. A good example of the importance of family rivalries occurred during the 1964 provincial election campaign. Two leading DC families quarrelled over the choice of candidates, and the party secretary resigned because his uncle's candidature was rejected.

As I described in Chapter 3, until the advent of Fascism, local politics were dominated by a small group of influential landowners. If one is to speak of party in this period it must be in the sense of Weber's clique of notables. In parliamentary elections the contest was between government and non-government candidates. Contestants in local elections were referred to as factions. Government candidates were dependent on the good-will of local notables and their followers, for there were no party offices or constituency organisations which could be used to gather support.

Although since 1946 all the main political parties have established branches in Pertosa, they have not, at least, until very recently, become independent of local landowners. In general, the latter have been able to control the appointment of officials, and to force the dissolution of communal administrations which failed to respect their interests. Moreover, since they have had direct access to deputies and ministers, they have usually been able to ignore the party hierarchy.

In their attempts to analyse political parties in their contemporary setting, sociologists have been primarily concerned to show the relationship between class interest and party affiliation. Thus, Lipset writes, 'Even though many parties renounce the principle of class conflict or loyalty, an analysis of their appeals and their support suggests that they do represent the interests of different classes.' Whilst other structural divisions in society are important, in general class interest determines party support.[5] In Italy as a whole this generalisation is probably true; in Pertosa neither class divisions nor party programmes or ideologies can adequately explain party affiliation.

Since the war three parties have dominated in Pertosa. Communal elections, with one exception, have been won alternately by the Christian Democrats, and either the Socialists alone or the Socialists and the Communists in coalition. For provincial and parliamentary elections Pertosa is grouped with other communes in one constituency. However, voting figures are available for individual communes, and on every occasion the DC party has been successful. During my stay in Pertosa I saw both a communal and a provincial election. At the hustings both were fought in terms of national party programmes. The provincial candidates and their advocates hardly spoke of local issues, and although such matters received fuller treatment during the campaign which preceded the communal elections, spokesmen generally

preferred to assess the achievements of their parties in parliament and not in the communal council. Listening to these speeches it would be easy to conclude that elections turn on ideological issues, and that the choice before the electorate is between the specific policies of the leading parties. But this is far from true.

After having watched me take notes of the candidates' speeches on successive evenings for almost a week, the secretary of the DC party thought it his duty to tell me that I was wasting my time. 'You must not allow yourself to be deceived by all this fuss,' he said, 'I greatly doubt if all these speeches have caused twenty people to change their minds.' Another member of the same party elaborated the point, when he told me that speeches from the hustings had lost their value. Formerly, the police had allowed two or more meetings to be held at the same time, so that by seeing who was present in the different crowds, it had been possible to make a rough estimate of the number of supporters of each candidate. But now this was no longer possible, for the police had forbidden the practice.

Speeches are made in correct and fluent Italian. Although the professional and landowning classes understand it as well as the local dialect, if one is to judge from the bouts of enthusiastic but ill-timed clapping during the speeches, and the comments made about them afterwards, the majority of the crowd had been able to follow only in a limited degree. It is then, both legitimate and necessary to consider to what extent the policies and ideologies which divide the Italian political parties are appreciated in Pertosa.

Apart from election campaigns, political information is diffused by radio and television, the newspapers and informal talks with educated party officials. Peasants and artisans have had easy access to radio and television only in the last three or four years. In this short period it is difficult to estimate the effect of these media. My impression is that programmes of news and current affairs and party political broadcasts were fairly unpopular. Indeed, most peasants had difficulty in understanding the language in which problems were discussed, and many of the arguments put forward were outside the range of their experience. Where political controversy is concerned, the newspapers are a better source of information, since the government had less control over them than it has over radio and television. But few newspapers are sold in Pertosa, and they are mostly bought by the upper classes.

Generally speaking, landowners and professionals are well informed about national politics. They could provide a valuable service to the village as a whole by passing on their knowledge. They rarely do so, because they are fully aware that control of information and a monopoly of communication between village and state is one of the most important dimensions of

their power. The DC leaders in particular are content to let well alone. They judge it to be against their interests to explain in detail the policies of their party, and prefer to foster the view expounded by the Church that the only course open to a person of religious convictions is to vote for the Christian Democrats. A vote for the left, especially for the Communists, is a sin.

The advantages conferred on the DC party by their association with the Church can be clearly seen in the use of electoral symbols. In communities in which there is a high rate of illiteracy these symbols are of great importance. The emblem of the DC party is the cross. Last minute canvassers go round the village with the effective slogan of '*mettete una croce sulla croce*' (Put a cross on the cross). The confusion between religious ideology and party is well illustrated by the story of an old peasant woman who, when asked how she had voted, replied, 'I cast my vote for Jesus'. The parties of the left are well aware of the advantages of symbols which have both religious and political connotations. Indeed, before the government decided to control their use, they themselves were not averse to adopting religious emblems. Thus, in 1953 the Socialist-Communist coalition put a picture of S. Giuliano, the patron saint of the village, on their ballot form instead of the usual plough. Tactically, this was astute for devotion to S. Giuliano is greater than that bestowed on Christ or any of the other central figures of Christian belief. Indeed, against the odds, the left-wing coalition won the election.

In Pertosa, as in many peasant societies studied by anthropologists, the channels of communication along which decisions made by the central government must pass are far from adequate. Since peasants have no means of assessing the way in which decisions are made, the orders of the central authorities which they see implemented at the local level appear arbitrary and non-rational. At best they can be accounted for by explanations which, although consistent with local experience, are gross misrepresentations of the intentions of those who made them.

The story of the portrait of the Minister Colombo is a good example. The minister is by far the best known local politician and is an honorary citizen of Pertosa. In 1961, when the Socialist-Communist alliance came to power, they decided to remove his picture which was hanging in the mayor's parlour. By 1963, Italy was in the throes of a balance of payments crisis, and government spending was reduced. Consequently, very little money was available for public works, and those who had formerly been employed on government building projects in the village found themselves out of work. At this time the story began to circulate that Colombo, offended by the affront of the communal administration, had publicly vowed that no

government contracts should be sent to Pertosa until the Socialists and Communists had been voted out of office, and the portrait restored to its rightful place. This tale is almost certainly fanciful. Party officials assured me that it was untrue, and it seems unlikely that a senior minister could make a statement of this kind. Nevertheless, in the peasant neighbourhood in which I lived it was widely believed, and I never heard party officials deny it publicly. Indeed, the incident had a curious sequel. At the end of the first meeting of the new DC council a ceremony was held at which the portrait was re-hung, and a toast was drunk to Colombo's health.

The strength of the story from the point of view of its peasant audience was that it provided an explanation in terms which they could understand. The motives behind the decision to reduce government spending were outside the realm of their experience; the withdrawal of patronage by an influential and offended friend was not. For party officials, credible or not, the story served its purpose, because its moral was to vote for the DC party.

In summary, then, it is difficult to maintain that voting behaviour is determined by rival policies or programmes, since only the few have detailed knowledge of these differences. From its ideological association with the Church, the Christian Democratic party derives great advantage, and this, together with its control of government patronage, is one of the main reasons for its consistent succession in elections. The parties of the left are denied both these assets, and depend more for support on protest, the votes of those with a grievance against the DC party and its allies, people who have been refused favours, or who have been unable to obtain government or party patronage.

As a means of predicting voting behaviour, theories of class interest are equally unconvincing. As I argued in Chapter 5, it is difficult to speak of class solidarity in Pertosa, for the links between the various social classes are as important as the ties within them. If class loyalty is the determining factor, how can one account for the supremacy of the Christian Democratic party, and the fact that since 1946 most peasants and artisans have given it their support? Similarly, although most of the village upper classes are either Liberals or Christian Democrats, they also provide the leaders of the Socialist and Communist parties.

The fact that peasants do not vote according to their class interests has long been recognised. In 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', Marx argued that illiterate peasants, working their tiny scattered plots and living in isolated hamlets, could not develop class consciousness.[6] This point has been elaborated by many sociologists. Thus, Lipset writes, 'One of the most striking cases of deviation from leftist voting within the lower

income-group is presented by some relatively poor and economically less-developed regions that regularly vote for conservative candidates.' The same author goes on to claim that ' the most powerful deterrent to leftist political action by impoverished workers and peasants of backward areas is the extent to which their minds are dominated by 'traditionalistic' values - resignation to a traditional standard of living and loyalty to the 'powers that be''.[7]

Although Lipset cites southern Italy as an example of a backward, traditionalistic area, his arguments are unconvincing when applied to Pertosa. The long-standing practice of emigration is hardly consistent with resignation to a traditional standard of living. To describe the ties which join peasants and artisans to the village upper classes as bonds of loyalty is to misunderstand the nature of the patron-client relationship between them, and the exchange of reciprocal services which brings them together. We are left, then, with two questions: On what principle do people vote? What factors determine their political affiliations? I shall attempt to answer these questions more fully in Chapter 9.

Illiteracy

The ability to read and write and to speak and understand fluent Italian is highly prized in Pertosa. The educated man can study for himself government codes and regulations, and is able to conduct his affairs with government agencies and officials on terms of comparative equality. When he enteres a government office he comes not as a supplicant begging a favour, but to demand a service to which he knows he is entitled. Provided the law is unambiguous, the civil servant must comply with his request, for he fears complaints to his superiors.

Few in Pertosa have this ability. According to the 1961 census, 24% of people over the age of six are illiterate. One cannot, however, assume that the remainder are able to read and understand complex civil service instructions or to complete a *pratica* unaided. In practice, only people with secondary school or university qualifications, and a handful of those with elementary school certificates, are able to perform these tasks satisfactorily. Many peasants and artisans, even though they once attended elementary school, have forgotten the skills they learned there. Together with the illiterate proper, they must use a mediator in their dealings with bureaucracy.

Although in post-war years the government has assumed a wide range of welfare functions, benefits are never granted automatically, as citizenship rights to which everyone is entitled. Villagers must scheme and manoeuvre to find their way through the morass of civil service instructions which regulate the payment of benefits, and demonstrate at great length that they are

really eligible for the services for which they are applying. In general terms I have already discussed the complexity of the Italian bureaucracy. It is perhaps worthwhile giving a practical example.

One of the commonest *pratiche* in Pertosa is the application for an old age pension. The application must be accompanied by a *corredo* (literally, a dowry) of documents to show that the applicant is entitled to a pension, and to enable the authorities to calculate the amount to be paid. A leaflet published by the *Previdenza Sociale* (the main welfare institute) lists 25 different certificates which might be needed. Although the average applicant would probably be required to produce only about half of these, the time and expense involved is obviously considerable. Some of these certificates are issued by the commune, but for the rest one must write to or visit offices in the provincial capital or even Rome. In each office he visits, the peasant can expect to be met with arrogance and delay, for in the South the insolence of office holders is proverbial. In the anti-rooms and corridors of government agencies it is common to find crowds of peasants waiting patiently for hours or even days, until such time as their documents are finally ready.

Understandably, most people prefer to work through intermediaries, who, in Pertosa at least, can be divided into three main types. First, there are a number of specialists who make frequent trips to offices where they are well known. For a small fee they can be commissioned to procure the necessary certificates. Secondly, one can obtain help from workers' associations and party officials. The latter are specifically forbidden to accept payment for their services. However, in so far as their aid is available only to party members, it is not unrealistic to consider that it is 'bought' with a vote and general party support. Lastly, one can seek the aid of a patron, usually a member of the village upper classes. In general, therefore, the peasant has a choice. He can attempt to obtain his objectives by a cash payment, or attach himself as a client to a party or an influential person. In order to understand the implications of this choice, it is necessary to examine the general concept of obligation in Pertosa.

The Concept of Obligation

In Old Calabria Normal Douglas remarks that south of Naples the word *grazie* (thank you) vanishes from the vocabulary of all but the most educated. This, he explains, is not because one is dealing with a thankless race, but because 'a thing given (is regarded as) a thing found, and the giver a blind instrument of fortune.'[8] The initial observation is acute, but the explanation incomplete. What Douglas fails to mention is that *grazie* is often replaced by the dialect word *obligatt* (I am obliged). More formal thanks

becomes superfluous when there is a specific recognition of obligation, of a debt that must be repaid. Furthermore, unless the gift or favour bestowed is made as part of an established pattern of exchange, for example, between *compari*, or comes from an outsider, most villagers will be wary of accepting it.

Distinguished strangers are importuned quite relentlessly in Pertosa, if they are thought to have influence in the wider Italian society. Thus, Francesco Nitti, the president of the *Magistrale* at Matera, describes how he was besieged by requests to write letters to government offices, and to use his influence to obtain pensions and work. One peasant woman even promised to kiss his feet in the same way as she kissed those of Christ, if only he would write to the *Previdenza Sociale* ('*Se me scrivete una lettera alla Previdenza Sociale, vi bacerò i piedi come a Gesu Cristo*).[9] If the visitor grants his request, the peasant may well regard him as the blind instrument of fortune, and almost certainly will not say *obligatt*, since he is unlikely to be under any obligation. Indeed, the whole point of importuning strangers is that they have no permanent relationship with the supplicant, and it is unlikely that they will ask for any return for the services they have provided.

If an offer of help comes from a *paesano*, the recipient will think carefully before accepting, since he knows from experience that he will be expected to make a return. This cautious attitude is well expressed in the local proverb '*Na cosa regalatt e na cosa carr pagatt*' (Gifts are paid for dearly), and it is quite common to refuse gifts and offers of help. Thus, for example, during the provincial election campaign, the Socialist candidate, whose wife had just given birth to a son, invited me to have a celebratory drink. In the bar he offered drinks all round, and everybody accepted except for one peasant who was a known supporter of the DC party. After the bartender had explained the reason for the celebration, he quickly changed his mind and drank the toast with a good grace. There were two main motives for his initial refusal. First, fellow party members seeing him drink with the leader of the opposition might conclude that he had betrayed them and that his new patron was dispensing hospitality in return. Secondly, he feared that having accepted the drink he would be invited to give his vote, and his sense of obligation would make it difficult for him to refuse.

This desire to avoid contracting obligations is perhaps clearer in another case. The daughter of a peasant neighbour of mine failed part of her school examinations. Since she wanted to continue her studies, it was necessary to have private tuition during the summer. Her cousin, a university student, went to his uncle, her father, *Zi Lorenzo*, and offered to coach the girl free of charge. The latter refused because he didn't want to become too indebted to

his nephew's family (*sarei troppo obligatt a u signori*). He feared that in return he would be asked to work his brother's fields, and that in a division of property between them, which was due to be made later in the year, his sense of obligation would place him at a disadvantage. By his own telling, *Zi Lorenzo* had been unfortunate in his choice of patrons. Some years ago, he quarrelled with his second cousins over rights in a house. Since he was sceptical of the ability of the village lawyer, he asked the advice of a local barber, who promised to help him by persuading the lawyer in the next town to take up his case. In the last three years he has worked many days without pay in the barber's fields and has taken small sums of money and gifts of food to his home. His lawsuit, however, has progressed no further. At present, *Zi Lorenzo* is trying to obtain a pension for a wound he received during the war. But on this occasion he has preferred as his intermediary the son of a large landowner for whom he once worked. He told me that the reason for his choice was that his new patron lived outside the village, and had sold most of the lands he once owned there. Consequently, there was little chance of his being called on to perform too many services in return for the favour he hoped to receive.

In order to avoid the onerous obligations of clientship, peasants often prefer to enter into a straightforward cash relationship with bureaucratic intermediaries. In Pertosa, there are two officials who specialise in transactions of this sort. The first, an artisan, is the secretary of a minor political party, the second, a peasant, the head of a workers' association. Since both are of fairly low status, they have little chance of making successful political careers. Consequently, they are far more interested in exploiting the financial possibilities of their offices than in using them to build up networks of clients which would provide them with electoral support. The usual arrangement is that peasants entrust their *pratiche* to one of these specialists, who takes the necessary steps to obtain the pension or allowance. When the *pratica* is finally completed, he is paid a fixed sum of money or, since welfare benefits invariably arrive late, agrees to take one-half of the arrears. The sums involved are often quite high. This practice is illegal, for officials are paid by the party for the services they provide. Nevertheless, it offers some advantages to the peasants and artisans who make use of it. Their commitments are quite specific. They know in advance the cost of the service they require, and payment is by results. Nor is there any need to pledge their support to a particular party, thereby exposing themselves to political discrimination.

But the choice between cash payment and clientage is not always available. It exists only when the desired bureaucratic service is straightforward and unambiguous, and can be procured at the local level. Simple citizenship

rights such as pensions, welfare benefits and passports can usually be obtained on a straight cash basis, but there are many occasions on which villagers seek services and benefits which require the connivance or consent of national politicians and bureaucrats. Generally speaking, the latter can only be obtained by exploiting the extra-village political networks of influential upper class patrons.

Corruption

In Pertosa it is commonly held that all politicians and bureaucrats are corrupt. The peasant dialect word *rotola* is used to describe the party lists, and more specifically the winning list, the party in office. In formal Italian the word literally means a roll, in dialect it denotes a conspiracy of self-interest. When a peasant speaks of the *rotola* he is indicating a group of politicians who have combined to further their personal interests to the detriment of the common good. Indeed, accusations of self-interest (*interesse*) are frequently made against all politicians. The bureaucracy arouses similar feelings. The general attitude towards it is summed up in the local proverb '*S. Antonio ha fatto tredici grazie, ma S. Mangione ne ha fatto quattordici.*' The renowned favours bestowed on mankind by St Anthony are as nothing when compared with those obtained by bribery. In fact, one local official, well known for his rapacity, is sometimes called '*Don Mangione*'.

These accusations, however, are not only made by people at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The gentry and professionals often discuss the corruption of national party leaders, and insist that they are only interested in feathering their own nests. As for the bureaucracy, the belief in the *busterella* - money placed in an envelope and given to a civil servant for services rendered - is common to all classes throughout Italy. And it is generally believed that bureaucratic services and favours are distributed not according to impartial rules, but to those with the strongest *raccomandazioni*.

For the outsider observer it is no easy task to establish to what extent these accusations are justified. Corruption is punishable by law, and guilty officials are unlikely to furnish evidence of their misdeeds. Moreover, the same set of actions may be open to more than interpretation. If an enemy is suspected of corruption, I will without hesitation call him an *imbroglione* (cheat); in the same circumstances I would simply describe a friend as *furbo*, someone who knows how to take care of his own interests. One of the most frequently used electoral strategems is to try to blacken the character of opponents by accusing them of favouritism and abuse of power. These charges are invariably denied, and counter accusations are brought forward.

From the mass of political scandals which are evoked, it is difficult to establish which are well founded and which are not. Thus, during the provincial elections I was assured by members of the DC party that the headmistress of the *scuola media* was abusing her official powers to help her husband, the Socialist candidate. In fact, a formal complaint was made to the *Provveditorato* accusing her of threatening to withhold free textbooks from the children of her husband's political enemies. Both she and her husband protested her innocence, and members of the Socialist party claimed that the charges were simply DC scandalmongery.

Accusations of this sort, however, are not only confined to members of opposing parties; they are frequently made by members of the same party. Thus, in 1965 at the last meeting of the Socialist-Communist administration a dissident councillor openly accused his colleagues of having governed not in a spirit of impartiality or for the common good, but out of motives of 'paternalism, favouritism and clientage'. He maintained that the sole aim of the mayor and the main assessors had been to find jobs for their kin and friends. The mayor denied the charges, and replied that the dissident councillor was discontented only because the council had failed to find a post for his brother.

Although it is difficult to find a suitable alternative, the word corruption is unfortunate, because its emotional overtones are entirely opprobrious. I shall, however, try to use it in the most neutral possible way. Formally, in the Italian bureaucratic and political systems office holders are expected to perform their duties impartially and according to fixed rules. In so far as they fall short of these expectations, I shall describe their behaviour as corrupt.[10] However, I do not wish to imply that corruption is necessarily either reprehensible or dysfunctional, although clearly it sometimes is. Indeed, one may argue that in a bureaucratic system as complex as that of Italy, with its endless regulations and 'red tape', corruption is both necessary and inevitable. Only by seeking a recommendation to high levels in the service, or by persuading an official to overlook the rules, one can obtain a decision at all. A similar point is made by local apologists of the system who maintain that the sole effect of the 'informal methods' used to influence civil servants is that of ensuring speedier service.

That corruption is not always regarded as morally despicable should be clear if we now turn to consider the role of the office holder in Pertosa. In December most emigrants return from Germany and Switzerland, and during the month they spend in the village they are entitled to draw unemployment pay. Almost everyone who went to claim this right took a packet of cigarettes or a small gift to the *collocatore*. When I asked why they thought

it necessary to do so, I was told that gifts are a sign of respect, and a token of gratitude. Only after insistent questioning did I learn that it was believed that if gifts were not forthcoming there might be a delay in receiving unemployment pay, or in future years some irregularity in one's papers would be used as an excuse for not paying it at all.

The act of giving cigarettes is in no way considered corrupt. It is a simple acknowledgement of the power of the *collocatore*, and the motives behind it are similar to those which induce peasants to take presents to landowners on whom they depend. The official is not seen as a servant of the public who must apply a body of impartial rules, but as a holder of power who can give and withhold benefits as he pleases. Since officials rarely admit to partial behaviour, it is difficult to assess their attitude to the gifts they supposedly receive. Most office holders protest their own honesty, but are usually ready to discuss the misdeeds of their fellows. In this context the main justification for corrupt practices is that they are poorly paid, and must find some way of supplementing their incomes. In the words of the wife of one official, '*Dobbiamo mangare pure noi*' (We too must eat).

In Pertosa it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between 'honest' and 'dishonest' officials. Most refrain from what the state considers to be the most serious forms of corruption: peculation, bribery and the malversation of public funds. Nevertheless, there is always a strong personal element in their decisions. Even when an official tries to keep separate his public and private roles, other members of the community fail to appreciate the difference between the two. Thus, in 1965 the *collocatore* stood as a DC candidate in the communal elections. He denied that his official position gave him any advantage, and claimed that he had not even asked people to vote for him, since he feared that those who promised to support him would later come to the *Ufficio di Collocamento* to claim their reward. In his own words, '*Il buon vino si vede senza frasca. Io non faccio propaganda. Chi vuole può votare per me. Se chiedo, mi chiederanno*' (Good wine needs no bush. People who want to vote for me can. If I ask (for votes) they will come and ask (for favours)). This declaration, however sincere, was ingenuous. In the past the *collocatore* has performed services for many villagers. Since these services were regarded as personal favours, most of them felt indebted to him. Whether he reminded them of their obligations was immaterial; they still believed that their debts could best be paid by voting for him.

Pertosa is a small face-to-face community in which, to use Gluckman's term, relationships are multiplex. In this setting it is difficult to segregate the various roles which a person must play. In the case I have just considered, the role of *collocatore* impinged on that of election candidate. Most officials

are *paesani*, and through ties of kinship, affinity and *comparizio*, or as part of networks of patrons and clients are able to trace relationships to almost every other member of the village. People who seek their services try to invoke ties which give them the right to preferential treatment. Consequently, the office holder is faced with a series of dilemmas. On the one hand, he should carry out his duties according to a set of impartial rules, on the other, he is expected to favour kin, aid clients and to repay his own obligations to patrons and political superiors who were probably responsible for his appointment in the first place. However skillfully he performs his duties he is bound to disappoint somebody, and is always open to accusations of corruption.

Notes to Chapter 7

1 Duverger (1964: xxiii).

2 Weber (1921: 100-113).

3 Throughout this section I draw a contrast between the nature of parties in Pertosa and an ideal type of modern political party. I am well aware that in doing so I am in danger of oversimplifying political processes in modern industrial societies. I certainly do not want to imply that in Great Britain, for example, elections turn only on ideological issues, or that personal rivalries between politicians do not occur, or even that class position is an infallible indicator of voting behaviour. Nevertheless, it does seem to to me that there are important structural differences between parties in southern Italy and those in most western industrial societies. These differences have been well brought out in a number of studies which have been made by political scientists contrasting party organization in northern and southern Italy. See, for example, Tarrow (1967).

4 '*Sedici candidati che vanno a genio a Don Antonio Martino, che, pur essendo liberale, riesce a comandare e a dare ordini ai democristiani del paese e di tutto il circondario, fino al punto di scegliersi i candidati di fiducia e di scartare o di bocciare quelli che non gli garbano*' (Unità, 18.6.1965).

5 Lipset (1963: 220).

6 Marx and Engels (1950, Vol. 1: 302-3)

7 Lipset (1963: 258-9).

8 Douglas (1915: 136).

9 Nitti (1958b).

10 The Italian penal code (arts 314-35) establishes penalties of between six months and five years imprisonment for public officials found guilty of accepting bribes, or soliciting promises of favours and rewards in the course of their duties. The attempt to corrupt an official is equally a criminal offence and attracts similar penalties. In this context the mayor and assessors are defined as public officials.