Chapter 8

Politicians and Leaders

Politicians

The *consiglieri comunali* are drawn from all social classes. In the six post-war councils more than half of them have been peasants and artisans, and they have normally provided two of the four assessors. On the other hand, the office of mayor has been monopolised by the village upper classes.[1] In terms of class background there is little difference between Christian Democratic and Socialist and Communist councillors.[2]

Nowadays, peasant and artisan representation on the council is greater than in the past, but their ability to influence its decisions is still small. Although they often hold important posts both in the parties and on the council, decisions about party policy and the introduction of new legislation are normally made by upper class councillors and party officials. Thus, the secretary of the Socialist party, who was an artisan, took no part in the 1964 provincial elections. It was left to a former Socialist mayor, a local schoolteacher, to introduce outside speakers and to organise the campaign with provincial party officials. Similarly, at council meetings it is unusual for peasants to register anything other than their votes; discussion is largely confined to upper class councillors.

At first sight it is surprising that peasants and artisans should become party secretaries and assessors without being able to exercise the power with which these posts are formally endowed. There are, however, two main reasons why this is so. In the first place, they often hold office as the clients of upper class patrons who, for reasons of political expedience, or because they are already permanent officials of the commune, are unable or unwilling to accept these posts. Even when a peasant takes office without the help of a patron, he is loath to reject the advice and suggestions of a member of the upper classes, since he knows that in future he may have to seek his support and protection. Secondly, peasant and artisan councillors are handicapped by their lack of education and their scant knowledge of communal law.

In the eyes of the electorate the most successful council is that which is best able to tap the resources of the state for benefit of the village. The

building of new roads, schools and government subsidised housing is viewed with great favour, not so much because these amenities are prized in themselves, but because government spending brings money into the village, and provides work for many Pertosini who otherwise would be obliged to go abroad. In the three most recent communal elections all parties have presented a series of plans, usually unrealisable, for massive public investment in Pertosa. At the hustings the charge of *immobilismo*, the failure to promote these schemes successfully, is the most damning accusation that any party has to face. Peasant and artisan office holders find it particularly difficult to carry out programmes of this sort. In order to do so they must have detailed knowledge of the ways in which the commune is entitled to borrow money, and be able to draft their proposals in a form which is legally acceptable to the provincial authorities. In both cases they must rely on the advice and judgment of upper class councillors and party officials.[3]

Many of the disadvantages which face peasant and artisan councillors can be illustrated by examining in detail the last eighteen months of the 1961-1965 *Aratro* administration. After the sudden death of the mayor, the council executive had to be re-organised. The new mayor was a shopkeeper, and three out of the four *assessori* artisans and peasants. This arrangement caused much consternation in Pertosa. Political opponents said quite openly that it was disgraceful that the commune should have such representatives. Men who found it difficult to express themselves in Italian could hardly be expected to create a good impression with the provincial authorities. Thus, a fervent DC supporter, himself a shopkeeper, somewhat rhetorically declaimed, *'Non c'è di meglio in paese! Ci deve comandare quell'ignorantone!'* (Has the village no better candidate! Must we be ruled by that ignoramus!) The leaders of the Socialist party tried to justify their choice by claiming that it was a triumph for democracy, and that it was time that Pertosa had a lower class mayor. But most villagers, well aware of the quarrel which had preceded his appointment, were sceptical of this explanation.

After the formation of the new DC council in 1965, a leading Socialist told me that the difference in the social composition between the previous and the present administration was a clear demonstration that his party was much more democratically inclined than the Christian Democrats. I repeated this assertion to the secretary of the DC party who dismissed it with scorn, and accused his opponent of trying to mislead me. In fact, I was assured, the appointment of five professionals as mayor and assessors was far more democratic that the Socialist party's practice of choosing artisans and peasants. When five men of similar high status were responsible for local government, not only would they be able to command attention outside the

village, but they would also control one another. No one of them would be able to manipulate the advantages of office in his own favour. On the other hand, the Socialist party in office either did nothing at all, or was dominated by a single upper class man. True, the other assessors were peasants and artisans, but in practice they were his clients and did his bidding.

In the latter part of his statement the DC party secretary was implicitly comparing two contrasting periods in the *Aratro* administration which had just come to an end. Between 1961 and 1964 the Socialist mayor was a local doctor. Three of the remaining majority councillors (*consiglieri di maggioranza*) were also professionals, but none of them held executive office. One assessor was a shopkeeper, the rest were peasants and artisans. All the assessors were indebted to the mayor for the support he had given them in obtaining their posts, and they were closely identified with his policies. On the other hand, only one of the professionals, the mayor's maternal uncle, gave him unqualified support. Both of the others quarrelled with him: the first because he refused to appoint his brother to a post in the gift of the commune, the second because he objected to the methods which he used in selecting communal employees. Wherever possible the mayor had dismissed employees who supported the DC party and replaced them with men of his own choice. This policy led to wide resentment in the party, and brought dissension in the council.[4] However, since the mayor had a large following in the council and his clients held the most important executive offices, it was difficult to challenge him directly.

After the death of the mayor, the measure of disagreement between the three remaining professionals was such that each felt obliged to block the candidature of the others. Ultimately a shopkeeper, the most eligible of the assessors, was promoted to the office. One of the professionals, who was eventually to head the *Aratro* list in the next elections, openly disassociated himself from the administration. Another attacked his colleagues in public. During the 1965 election it was agreed by all parties that the last eighteen months of Socialist-Communist rule had been singularly unsuccessful. In order that the party might have some chance of victory, the outgoing mayor and assessors were all excluded from the *Aratro* list. No public works had been begun in Pertosa, and a plan to promote tourism had received little encouragement from the provincial authorities. The popular prediction that a shopkeeper mayor and a handful of artisans and peasants would be unable to handle the affairs of the commune seemed amply confirmed.

Leaders

In Pertosa there is no word which is the precise equivalent of the English term leader. The professional class, dissatisfied with the very general *capo* (head) and the over precise *sindaco* (mayor), normally use the English word itself. Peasants sometimes use these words ironically, for example in the phrase *i capi del paese* or in the nickname *u sindaco del Torre* (of a peasant who longwindedly instructs his neighbours in the intricacies of national politics). The term *padrone* is used only in the context of work, or generically to denote the rich. Indeed, the concept of leadership is usually expressed indirectly in phrases such as *qui comando io* (I'm in charge here) and *quelli che comandano* (those who give orders and can be sure that they will be obeyed).

But in spite of this absence of precise terms, peasants have clear notions of the qualities they expect in leaders, and there is frequent discussion of the merits and failures of the various mayors and provincial councillors who have represented the village. The principal qualifications for leadership, as they emerge from these discussions, can be summarised as follows: a good education, courage, a wide range of friendships and contacts, *furbizia* and a great deal of diplomacy and tact. Leaders themselves agree that these qualities are necessary, and there is only a difference of emphasis between their own conception of their roles and that held by peasants. Thus, whilst leaders talk of the necessity of acquiring clients, peasant stress that they should be approachable. There is much resentment of upper class politicians who at election times show extreme friendship, only to retire behind a class barrier once they are safely in office.

In general terms I have already discussed the importance of education, and it is now only necessary to consider the indirect advantages it confers. Until very recently there were few secondary schools and institutes of higher education in the *Mezzogiorno*, and they were mostly concentrated in provincial capitals. People who received secondary education often attended the same schools and were likely to know each other. Since after school and university most southern Italians try to obtain jobs in their own town or province, educated Pertosini have many acquaintances and friends who work in government offices or who are influential politicians in the provincial capital. These networks of extra-village ties are of great help to those who wish to embark on a career in politics. If one seeks high office in the constituency organisations, or wishes to be chosen to head the party list, the support of the provincial party secretary is a great advantage. Similarly, a mayor who aspires to promote an ambitious programme of public works will find his task much easier if, at an informal level, he first asks the advice of friends

who work in the provincial offices which eventually have to vet his proposals.

The possession of a degree or diploma is also a necessary preliminary if one wishes to compete for the more important communal and civil service posts in the village. Local officials are in a very strong position to attract large numbers of clients. As a young and ambitious Pertosini once told me, the quickest way of achieving success in local politics is to start as a local official or to enter one of the professions which brings one into contact with a large number of artisans and peasants. In addition, it is well worth trying to obtain a party secretaryship. For in the course of their duties all office holders provide bureaucratic services which are popularly regarded as personal favours, creating debts which have to be repaid at election times in the currency of votes.

The political advantages enjoyed by village professionals can best be illustrated by examining briefly the career resources of doctors, by far the most influential members of this class. Indeed, in Pertosa the two most important political leaders in the last decade have both been doctors. The first is the *medico sanitario* (the medical officer of health), who, as such, is forbidden to stand for the council. Nevertheless, he is one of the most influential Christian Democrats in the village. Thus, during the communal elections of 1961 many peasants spoke of casting their votes for 'Don Lucio', and not for the DC party. Don Lucio's greatest political rival is also a doctor who was Socialist mayor between 1961 and 1964.

When I asked villagers why doctors were so powerful in local politics, they usually replied that it was because they knew the secrets of everybody. They are the only professionals who regularly visit peasants in their homes, and they have a knowledge of their patients' affairs which goes far beyond family medical histories. Since the prolonged illness of breadwinners can ruin peasant families, they are always anxious to keep on good terms with the doctor. But illness is not only feared because it brings material hardship, but also because it may lead to criticism and gossip which damages a family's reputation. Many forms of illness are thought to be divine punishments for immoral and anti-social behaviour, and before marriage it is still very common for a household head to ask the family doctor about the health of the proposed spouse and his or her family. An unfavourable answer can cause the engagement to be broken off.[5] Doctors, then, are one of the main arbiters of social reputation, and peasants and artisans show them a great deal of deference and respect. Thus, for example, although most peasants are now entitled to free medical treatment, many still make private yearly contracts with local doctors. Consequently, as in the past, they are often in their

debt. Indeed, I was told of one doctor who at election times visited all his patients, reminded them of their debts, and then asked for their votes.

Through their near monopoly of educational skills and qualifications landowners and professionals derive many political advantages. Their opportunities for network formation are far greater than those of ordinary villagers, and both inside and outside the village they have a far wider range of effective political ties. These ties of friendship and contacts in the outside world can be manipulated to put them in touch with politicians and decision makers in all the main power centres in the wider Italian society; as office holders and professionals in the village they have little difficulty in acquiring clients. Indeed, their intra and extra village networks are both complementary and mutually reinforcing. Their prestige and influence as local patrons, and consequently their value as clients to more important patrons outside Pertosa, depend on the number of clients who are attached to them. Conversely, their success in building up followings of clients at the local level depends, in part at least, on the power and influence of their friends and patrons in the wider society.

Not all office holders and professionals take an active part in politics. Thus, neither the village doctor (*medico condotto*) nor the veterinarian have any political ambitions, although they would have little difficulty in obtaining votes. When I asked the veterinarian why he abstained from such activities, he replied that he had no intention of making enemies. One of the main disadvantages of politics in Pertosa is that it is not a self- contained activity. Quarrels which begin on the hustings are continued for years, and contestants try to ruin each other not only politically but economically. Thus, after the provincial elections of 1964 the schoolteacher wife of the Socialist candidate was denounced by her husband's opponents. Had their accusations convinced the educational authorities, she would have lost her job. Similarly, communal employees who back the wrong party can be faced with ruin. Political stakes, then, are high, and leaders must be willing to face both political defeat and economic disaster. Thus, it needs courage to enter politics in Pertosa, and it is easy to understand why a man like the veterinarian, who has a safe job and an assured income, prefers not to take a risk.

Because it is so easy to make political enemies, it is a great advantage for a leader to be able to treat both colleagues and the electors with tact. In practice, this quality is rare. Both in provincial and communal elections there is a high casualty rate amongst politicians. Parties are often compelled to present lists of new and politically untried men at each election, for they fear that those who have already held office are so cordially disliked by the electorate that to put them up again would be to court defeat. There are two

main reasons why politicians make so many enemies. First, they invariably quarrel over the spoils of office. Secondly, in an effort to gain extra votes, they make a great many promises which they cannot hope to fulfil. Families are persuaded to change their political allegiances in the hope that one of their members will be given a job in the commune, only to find after the elections that there are a dozen aspirants to the same post. Only one man in Pertosa has twice been mayor in the post-war period, and he is renowned for the tact and diplomacy with which he treats both allies and opponents, and the skill he displays in not making promises which he cannot keep.

The rewards of office

The idea that men who compete for power are mainly attracted by the prestige conferred by high office is received with scorn in Pertosa. Although villagers agree that some men obviously enjoy exerting authority over others, they find it hard to believe that anyone will devote his time and money to politics unless he is assured of a tangible reward. When a politician has no obvious *interesse*, he is likely to be accused of *furbizia*, of craftily concealing his designs, and ulterior motives are usually found to explain his behaviour.[6] Conversely, it is held that a man who actively supports a party has the right to expect a reward. Thus, a shopkeeper, who for many years had been a leading DC propagandist, told me that he was thinking of resigning from the party because it had refused to find work for his two sons.[7] Generally speaking, there are two main sources of patronage which politicians can hope to tap: first, there are the jobs and contracts in the gift of the commune, secondly, the many favours and privileges which are granted by the provincial and central government.

The most important prize for the winning party in local elections is the right to appoint communal officials. Although there are well defined rules which regulate these appointments, the *partito di maggioranza*, whilst paying lip-service to the law, usually makes sure that the successful applicant is one of its supporters. Finding jobs and awarding contracts to political supporters and their families is the most effective way in which a party can reward them for their services. Indeed, if there were no patronage, it would be difficult if not impossible to maintain party support.

But communal patronage resources are in short supply, and there are always many more applicants than there are posts available. Consequently, party leaders must not only make the best use of those at their disposal (that is, they must give them only to their own supporters), but they should also seek to create new ones wherever possible. In part, this is achieved by dismissing existing employees, in part, they hope that the general expansion

of government services will lead to an increase in the number of employees under their jurisdiction.[8]

When a newly elected council takes office, one of its first acts is to review the terms of tenure of all *impiegati* and *salariati* who support the opposition. At worst these officials can expect to be dismissed or retired on pension, at best they are likely to be made uncomfortable. Thus, when the *Aratro* administration came to power in 1961, it dismissed three employees and compelled another to retire. In a similar fashion, the DC council which succeeded them got rid of the *tecnico comunale* (a sort of clerk of works), the protégé of the former Socialist mayor. Although it is by no means a simple matter to dismiss communal employees, for many of them are protected by law,[9] a determined mayor and assessors have various strategems at their disposal. A post can be declared redundant, or an employee harassed until he resigns or is provoked into insulting his new masters, who can then dismiss him for misconduct. The first of these alternatives is the least satisfactory. Although one gets rid of an opponent, one has, as it were, diminished one's patrimony, for the prefect is unlikely to be sympathetic when a few months later the council applies to increase an establishment which has recently been reduced.[10]

The harassment of officials who do not belong to the party in office is very common, and in the months which follow the installation of a new council there is always a great deal of tension in the municipal offices. Shortly after the DC party had won the elections in 1965, I went to ask for information from a communal employee, the brother of a former Socialist mayor, who hitherto had always been co-operative. To my surprise, he refused my request. Then, taking me aside, he explained *sotto voce*, '*Sono cattiva gente. Non posso fare niente senza il permesso per iscritto del sindaco. Altrimente rischio di perdere il mio posto.*' (They are wicked people (i.e. the new mayor and assessors) I can't do anything without the written consent of the mayor. Otherwise I am in danger of losing my job.) His caution was not unjustified. In the same period another clerk (who was also secretary of the Communist party) was officially reproved, and a young field guard, the son of an important Communist, was threatened with disciplinary action for failing to show sufficient respect to the mayor.[11] Occasionally, opposition employees receive very harsh treatment. Thus in 1961, a Christian Democratic municipal policeman, who hitherto had always worked in the village, was transferred to the country by the Socialist mayor. This was a great hardship, for the man was a partial cripple. In the course of his new duties he had to walk many miles each day.

When communal employees are treated in this way, it is not only vindictiveness on the part of their adversaries, but also a question of party strategy. Not only does their presence diminish the amount of patronage at the disposal of the new masters of the commune, but they are also politically dangerous. All officials are patrons, and as long as political adversaries remain in office, they command votes which will count against the party at the next elections.

A further aspect of this policy of harassment is the close supervision of opposition employees. The latter are so afraid of losing their jobs that they perform their duties impartially, according to the letter of the law, and are consequently unable to favour their clients. One of the best examples of the use of this policy is the *ricorso* (formal protest) against the headmistress of the *scuola media*, whose case I have already discussed earlier in this chapter. The leaders of the DC party suspected her of abusing her official position to help her husband during the provincial elections, and were determined that similar advantages should be denied him during the communal elections. Although they were unsuccessful in securing her dismissal, her fear of losing her job was sufficient to ensure that she remained neutral in the communal election campaign.

By rewarding its supporters with jobs, a party not only retains their loyalty, but also is able to extend the network of clients who can be expected to vote for it. It is, therefore, very important that all local patronage should be reserved for party members. Although the hardships caused by dismissing employees sometimes leads to resentment and criticism in the village, it is held to be quite proper for a party to give jobs only to its own supporters. Thus, shortly after the dismissal of the *tecnico comunale*, I asked the secretary of the DC party whom he had in mind for the post. He replied that so far no decision had been taken, but I could be sure that it wouldn't be a Socialist.

When one considers how closely the selection of communal employees is regulated by administrative law, it is somewhat surprising that the *partiti di maggioranza* are so successful in appointing candidates of whom they approve. In Table 5 I have listed the twelve main appointments of the *Aratro* administration between 1961 and 1965. Only one post went to a known DC supporter, and she was a war-widow who was legally entitled to preference. Three of the posts were decided by public examination, but in each case the winner was a close relative of a member of the council, or a prominent supporter of the Socialist or Communist parties. Four of the employees appointed were kin or clients of the mayor, two were the brothers of the deputy mayor, and one was the son of a Socialist assessor.

Table 5: The appointments of the Socialist Communist Administration 1961-1965

	Type of Job and method of Selection[12]	Relationship to Member(s) of the Council	Political Affiliations
1	Field-guard (*concorso*)	Husband of servant of mayor	Socialist
2	Field-Guard (*concorso*)		Communist (son of leading party propagandist)
3	Secretary of *scuola media*	Sister of mayor's wife	Socialist (daughter of an ex-councillor)
4	*Tecnico comunale* (temporary)	Fiance of number 3	Socialist
5	Caretaker of Cemetary (*titoli*)	Brother of deputy mayor	Communist
6	Driver of communal hearse (*titoli*)	Brother of deputy mayor	Communist
7	Caretaker of the communal slaughter-house (*concorso*)		Communist (local secretary of the *camera del lavoro*)
8	Roadsweeper (temporary)	Son of Socialist assessor	Socialist
9	Caretaker of the *scuola media* (temporary)	Mother of mayor's servant	Probably Socialist
10	ditto		D.C. (war widow)
11	ditto	Client and occasional servant of mayor	Socialist
12	ditto	Sister of councillor	Socialist

While I was in Pertosa only one *concorso* 'went wrong'. The council decided to appoint a *tecnico comunale*. Although five candidates, each of whom seemed suitably qualified, reached the final examinations, Leonardo, the fiancé of the mayor's wife's sister, was strongly favoured to win, particularly when it became known that the mayor himself was to be chairman of the examination board. When the results were declared, however, it was found that all five candidates had been rejected. The *concorso* took place shortly before I left Pertosa, and Leonardo was unable to tell me what had gone wrong. But it was widely assumed in the village that the DC party had brought influence to bear on the provincial authorities, and that in order to avoid a scandal the examiners had decided to fail all the candidates.

Although the right to appoint to jobs in the gift of the commune is the most important patronage resource available to party leaders, it is by no means the only one. Local housing, contracts for public works, taxes and even documents issued by the commune are all distributed according to very similar criteria. But although these latter privileges are fiercely contested, strategically they are of less significance than the allocation of communal jobs, for even the least important office holders are patrons in miniature, who by the skillful exercise of their 'duties' can help to increase the strength and support of the party responsible for their appointment.

In terms of recruitment and the rewards of office at their disposal, there is a marked difference between the Socialist and Communist parties on the one hand, and the DC party on the other. Although the leaders of the latter are equally anxious to control communal patronage, most of them enter politics because they wish for favours and protection which can only be granted by the provincial and national authorities. Thus, in Pertosa whereas the older generation of landowners and *professionisti* is equally divided between the parties of left and right, young schoolteachers and civil servants usually support the DC party which, they believe, is best able to improve their somewhat insecure career prospects. Most of them come from peasant and artisan families, and are expected to support their parents and younger siblings. Furthermore, many village schoolteachers are only partially qualified, and have uncertain tenure in a profession which is rapidly becoming overcrowded. Since their families depend on them, they find it difficult to complete their training, and in the attempt to keep their jobs they have turned to politics in the hope of receiving protection from the DC party.

Angelo, the present DC party secretary, who is also an assessor, is a good example. His parents are artisans, and his father was a founder member of the Communist party in Pertosa. However, when his son took a job in a seminary in order to pay his way through university, the family found it

necessary to switch their political allegiance. In 1959, with his degree in law still unfinished, Angelo managed to obtain a temporary post as physical training instructor. He has no recognised qualifications for the job, and in the last three years has been in considerable danger of losing it. Indeed, he has kept it only because he has been able to persuade the provincial secretary of the DC party to intervene on his behalf by recommending him to the *Provveditore*. By the same means he has also succeeded in finding a job for his sister, who has recently qualified as an elementary teacher. Without political backing she would have had to wait for many years for her first appointment.

The political importance of the new *professionisti* is reflected in the social composition of the present DC council, in which all but one of the executive offices are held by members of this class. Two of the assessors have career patterns which are very similar to that of Angelo. One of them is reputed to be seeking promotion to headmaster in the *scuola media*; the other hopes to advance his career in the civil service and like Angelo needs the protection of the provincial party secretary, and this is the price they ask for their services.

But despite the DC party's recent success in recruiting young professionals, and the advantages which it derives from the control of state patronage, it is unlikely that it will be able to dominate the government of the commune permanently. Although its resources are far more extensive than those of any of the other parties, competition for them is also correspondingly greater. Thus, the support which the party receives from hopeful and ambitious professionals is balanced by the opposition of those who have been refused preferment; for patronage is not only the main source of political cohesion, but also the major cause of conflict and dissension.

Notes to Chapter 8

1 Since 1946 there have been seven mayors. Six have been either landowners or schoolteachers. The seventh was a shopkeeper, but his appointment was exceptional. He held office for a short period after the death of the former mayor, but only after a quarrel between upper class councillors had made it impossible for one of them to take up the post.

2 Appendix B gives full details of the social composition of all the councils since the war. The only important difference between the Socialists and Communists on the one hand and the Christian Democrats on the other is that the latter have been much more successful in recruiting the support of the younger generation of schoolteachers and civil servants.

3 In theory it is the duty of the *Secretario Comunale* to give advice of this sort. In practice, however, secretaries are either local appointments or

come from small southern towns very similar to Pertosa. Both of the secretaries I knew in Pertosa were closely identified with the upper classes. Consequently, as in the case of other local officials, they were not regarded as impartial civil servants who could be relied upon to give a straightforward bureaucratic service, and peasant and artisan councillors were reluctant to ask their advice.

4 In Pertosa it is thought to be quite legitimate for a council to dismiss opposition employees. In this case, however, the leaders of the Communist party and several councillors objected to the policy of the mayor because they thought he was advancing the claims of personal favourites rather than those of meritorious party supporters. The conflict came to a head when he appointed the husband of his servant to the post of field-guard in preference to the son of a leading Communist propagandist and party worker.

5 In one case, for example, the doctor is said to have replied 'Surely you can find a better match for your son'. The father broke off the engagement not so much because the girl's health was poor, but because he feared it might become so. His son's fiancée's sister was partially paralysed, and her misfortune was popularly attributed to the misconduct of her mother, who was renowned for her imprecations against the local saint.

6 An example of this attitude is provided by the case of the DC provincial candidate in 1964. During the electoral campaign the latter tried to make it quite clear that he had no personal interests at stake. Indeed, he made the forceful point that since he had no relations in need of jobs, he would make an honest and effective councillor who could concentrate on helping the village as a whole. In Pertosa, however, it was widely rumoured that he sought election because he needed a DC party *raccomandazione* in order to keep his job. As far as I am aware, this accusation was completely false.

7 The shopkeeper, a certain Natale, told me that he had asked the secretary of the Minister Colombo to find jobs for his two sons who had recently qualified as *geometri* (land surveyors). The latter replied that it was difficult to comply with his request, since candidates for state employment had to be chosen on merit, and the children of DC party supporters could not automatically be preferred. Commenting on this refusal, Natale remarked angrily, 'Did he think I'd given my time and energy for nothing? The party should always give preference to its own.'

8 Thus, for example, when the *scuola media* was built in 1964, five new communal posts were established.

9 See chapter 6 above for further details.

10 The permission of the prefect is normally required for both reductions and increases in the communal establishment.

11 His main offence was that he failed to salute the mayor during the *passeggiata*.

12 There are two main methods of selecting communal employees: by public examination (*concorso*) or by a simple examination of their qualifications (*titoli*). Alternatively, they can be appointed for a trial period (usually two years) at the end of which their appointments can be made permanent.