

Chapter 7

Variations in Response to Industrialisation

Introduction

In the last two chapters I have sought to provide a systematic and chronological account of the way in which the public authorities in Manfredonia responded to the advent of industry. My main concern has been with parties and factions: with their differing perceptions of the role of industry, and with the tactics they employed in their attempts both to 'control' the new resources coming into the town, and to modify the industrial decision making process. The advantage of this approach is that it helps us to understand the way in which relations between town and factories developed over time; its main limitation is that it does not provide an accurate or fully comprehensive guide to Manfredonian attitudes to the changes which were occurring in their midst.

For reasons that I discussed in Chapter 4, it is important to remember that the parties (and the factions of which they are composed) are transactional and not moral or ideological coalitions. One cannot, therefore, assume that the ideas and policies of the party leadership are shared by all its supporters, or that the variety of responses adopted by the various parties on any specific set of issues accurately reflects the range of attitudes present in the community as a whole. No party, of course, can afford to ignore entirely the interests of the electors; and there is a recurrent fear amongst all politicians that large-scale popular issues will arise which will destroy the delicately constructed patron-client networks on which they depend. But within these limitations, party leaders are free to formulate their own policies and to decide the ideological framework in which they will be presented.¹

As we saw in earlier chapters, the positions adopted by the various parties during both the ENI and ENEL controversies were only a partial representation of the full range of opinions and attitudes held by Manfredonians. Thus, pollution and a loss of agricultural and tourist resources were major issues in both political campaigns, but were of relatively little concern to those social groups supposedly most threatened by them. Conversely, the widespread popular resentment that most of the advantages of

industrialisation would go to Montesantangelo was left unharnessed by the political parties. The purpose of this present chapter is to explore these differences more fully, and through a detailed analysis of the attitudes and perceptions of different social and economic groups to illustrate the range and variety of Manfredonian responses to industrialisation.

The basic premisses

Inevitably, the introduction of large-scale factory technology meant that Manfredonians were compelled to re-appraise existing modes of livelihood; and their responses to it varied according to their position in the occupational structure, their evaluation of existing economic opportunities, and their assessment of the extent to which these would change for better or for worse as a result of the new industrial resources coming into the town.

Generally speaking, Manfredonians of all social classes expressed dissatisfaction with their existing economic situation and occupational status. As Table 10 shows, the vast majority of parents did not wish to see their children following in their own occupational footsteps; and although understandably this desire was strongest amongst manual workers, almost 60% of large landowners and professionals we interviewed wished to set up their children in a different career. Moreover, although three-quarters of all Manfredonians believed that economic and social conditions had greatly improved since the war, most professionals, traders and artisans, and nearly all large and small landowners felt that their own living standards and social positions had been eroded when compared with those of manual workers (see Tables 11 and 12).

Table 10: Do you want your children to follow the same occupation as yourself?

	Yes	No	Don't know	Total
Large landowners/profs.	10	23	10	43
Traders and Artisans	7	18	6	31
Small Landowners	2	17	-	19
Fishermen	3	21	3	27
Agricultural Labourers	-	21	-	21
Other manual workers	3	45	5	53
Total	25	145	24	194
Percentages	13	75	12	100

Table 11: Do you believe that the economic and social conditions of your occupational category have improved or deteriorated over the last twenty years?

	Improved	Worsened	Stayed the same	Don't know	Total
Large landowners/profs.	25	13	3	2	43
Traders and Artisans	20	10	1	-	31
Small Landowners	8	8	2	1	19
Fishermen	23	1	2	1	27
Agricultural Labourers	20	-	-	1	21
Other manual workers	47	6	-	-	53
Total	143	38	8	5	194
Percentages	74	20	4	2	100

Table 12: In comparison with other groups of workers would you say that the position of your occupational category has improved or deteriorated over the last twenty years?

	Improved	Worsened	Stayed the same	Don't know	Total
Large landowners/profs.	4	24	8	7	43
Traders and Artisans	7	12	12	-	31
Small Landowners	1	18	-	-	19
Fishermen	15	3	5	4	27
Agricultural Labourers	7	6	6	2	21
Other manual workers	28	12	9	4	53
Total	62	75	40	17	194
Percentages	32	38	21	9	100

Status and occupational dissatisfaction took two distinct forms. For the better-off it was a question of relative deprivation: for the poorer sections of the community it was based on the fear that the traditional manual occupations, however much improved, would never provide an adequate standard of living or an acceptable way of life. Thus, landowners and professionals were acutely aware that the erosion of differentials between manual and non-manual occupations was steadily depriving them of the deference and domestic services of people whom they were accustomed to regard as their

inferiors. And many of the younger ones were increasingly obliged to work their own lands or to take an extra job in order to maintain their traditional living standards. At the other end of the social scale, improvements in pay and conditions had not brought about any significant revaluation of traditional low status manual occupations. Thus, despite the increase in mechanisation which has taken much of the drudgery out of work on the land, and the fact that decreasing competition for jobs has brought improvements in wages and working conditions, agricultural day labourers were generally convinced that prospects in agriculture were much poorer than those in industry. Their views were shared by most smallholders and building workers whose incomes were uncertain and unpredictable, and subject to market forces over which they have little or any control.

It is against this background of status and occupational dissatisfaction that the Manfredonian response to the advent of industry must be assessed. Table 13 shows that support in principle for industrialisation was almost universal.

Table 13: In general terms, are you for or against industrialisation?

	For	Against	Don't know	Total
Landowners, professionals	35	8	-	43
Traders and Artisans	28	1	2	31
Small Landowners	17	1	1	19
Fishermen	17	9	1	27
Agricultural Labourers	21	-	-	21
Other manual workers	49	1	3	53
Total	167	20	7	194
Percentages	86	10	7	194

All social groups were strongly in favour of it, and only in the fishing community and amongst landowners and professionals were there significant pockets of resistance. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that popular enthusiasm for industrialisation was mainly grounded on a general feeling that existing economic prospects were so dismal, that any change, any addition to existing opportunities, was likely to be for the better. And that whilst expressing their approval for industrialisation in general, Manfredonians reserved the right to judge any specific set of proposals according to the way in which they believed they would affect their own economic interests and modes of livelihood.

Landowners and Professionals

The reactions of landowners and professionals to the ENI-ENEL projects were the most complex of any social group in Manfredonia, and by far the most difficult to isolate from the general political response to industrialisation which I discussed in previous chapters. In part, this difficulty was purely practical. In drawing up questionnaires and interview schedules, it was almost impossible to find a sufficient number of landowners and professionals who were not actively engaged in politics, and whose response to questions about industrialisation was not thereby coloured by the views of the parties and associations which they represented. More fundamental, however was the fact that for members of these groups appraisal of the impact of industry was as much based on political as on economic considerations. As we saw in Chapter 4, in recent years Manfredonia's upper classes have increasingly turned to politics as a mode of livelihood, and have sought to redress their declining economic fortunes by exploiting their roles as brokers between the local and national communities. In these circumstances, new resources are valued not only for the direct economic benefits they bring, but to the extent to which their allocation can be controlled by the traditional political elite.

The ENI project offered few direct economic advantages to landowners and professionals. Most of the factory's managers and professional advisers were outsiders; and what jobs were available were hardly suitable for the children of upper-class families. A score of small and medium-sized landowners were fortunate enough to sell their lands to the company at a handsome profit; but many more were disappointed. An even smaller number of entrepreneurs were awarded factory contracts, but these were generally regarded as windfalls, not likely to be repeated. And although most landowners and professionals believed that the creation of the factory complex would encourage the growth of other industries in the area, they were doubtful whether they themselves would derive any benefits from such expansion.² Indeed, in the eyes of most landowners, such marginal benefits as these were more than outweighed by the fear that the industrial development programme would involve the town in extra social costs, which they as the principal taxpayers would eventually be called upon to meet.

Socially, too, the prospect of industrial development had few attractions for Manfredonia's upper classes who saw in it a threat to their traditional way and style of life. Some were worried that the creation of the new port and new road and rail links would destroy the medieval character of the town; many others that effluent from the factory would ruin the environment. A more subtle threat was the arrival of well-paid, highly educated northern

technocrats, unable or unwilling to recognise the finely drawn status divisions of southern society and the legal classical traditions of its elite, and who seemed impervious to offers of hospitality and to attempts to draw them into the intricate web of upper-class reciprocities.³

The political benefits resulting from the ENI project were not sufficient to persuade landowners and professionals that they were adequate compensation for losses in other directions. From the outset it was apparent that political 'control' of the new industrial resources coming into the town would be restricted to a small segment of the traditional political elite and that no amount of bluff and impression management could conceal this fact from the mass of the population for long. In these circumstances the best that most landowners and professionals could hope for was the arrival of other industries which might broaden the scope for political brokerage.

Taken overall, landowners and professionals had good reason to be wary of the impact of industry, and their reactions to it varied from cautious approval to outright hostility. The majority view was that although in principle Manfredonians stood to gain from industrialisation, potential benefits would vary according to the size and type of incoming enterprise, and that each new development input should be judged on its merits. Broadly speaking people who took this view argued that industrial development ought to take one of two forms: either it should seek to complement existing economic activities by encouraging the growth of small-scale, labour intensive fish and food processing plants, or tourist facilities; or, if state investment on a large scale was envisaged, it should be concentrated on manufacturing industries (for example, car, aircraft, or mechanical engineering works) with a high employment potential. The first type of activity would involve Manfredonia in few additional social or infrastructural costs: the disadvantage of the second would be more than offset by the prospects of increased tax revenues and alternative employment for the town's many migrant labourers.

Judged by these criteria, the ENI and ENEL schemes clearly lacked appeal. Both were capital intensive and were dependent on technologies so complex and specialised that it was difficult to envisage any interplay between existing and new economic structures. Traditional occupational skills were largely irrelevant in the factory context, and there was little chance that they would stimulate the growth of satellite or service industries. In short, the accusation that the factory complex would be nothing more than 'a cathedral in the desert' seemed amply confirmed.

The political tactics adopted by most landowners and professionals were consistent with this negative assessment of the impact of the Manfredonia

project. Whilst deliberately avoiding giving the impression that they opposed industrialisation as such, they sought to hamper its progress in every way open to them. They were the fiercest critics of the Macchia decision, and the staunchest proponents of the anti-pollution lobby. Indeed, my strong impression is that it was only fear of alienating political clients which prevented them from advocating that the factory complex should move out of the area altogether.

In this respect, the attitude adopted by a minority group of lesser professionals (elementary schoolteachers and minor civil servants) is instructive. Of all members of the landowning and professional classes, they were the people most affected by the erosion of upper class living standards and life styles. And since they had their own *lista cittadina* representatives on the commune, they were least subject to political pressures from below. During the course of the ENI-ENEL controversies there was a steady hardening of their attitudes to industrialisation, which increasingly set them apart from their class peers. In 1966, they had broadly shared the views of all landowners and professionals: by 1970, they had become conspicuous not so much for their strident criticisms of ENI and ENEL, but for their growing conviction that large-scale state investment in industry in any form was likely to prove more harmful than beneficial to Manfredonia.

Shopkeepers, artisans and small landowners

For these groups, who constitute the middle ranks of Manfredonian society, the coming of industry posed much less of a threat than it did to large landowners and professionals. Socially, the arrival of outside managers and technocrats had no significant effects on their status positions, and the economic consequences of industrialisation, although slight, were generally beneficial. Most artisans and shopkeepers believed that the creation of a small but well paid labour force would increase turnover and lead to a greater demand for the goods and services they provided. And if some traders, restaurateurs and barkeepers, expressed the view that the establishment of a factory complex would drive away part of the seasonal tourist trade, others pointed to the advantages of a fixed, predictable and relatively affluent clientele.

But the impact of the factory complex was judged less in terms of its indirect economic effects than for the quantity and types of jobs it would provide. Initially, at least, members of all these groups saw in the prospect of industrial employment a possible solution to their main economic and social problems. Thus, for artisans, faced with a sharp decline in trade, and for shopkeepers, subject to increasing competition as successive waves of

returning migrants invested their savings in commerce, the creation of employment opportunities in other sectors offered some hope of relief. And for smallholders, disillusioned with the low status confirmed by agricultural activities, it held out the prospect of an alternative and socially more acceptable mode of livelihood. Above all, members of all three of these groups hoped to find long-term, well-paid, industrial employment for the many children in whose education they had painfully and heavily invested.⁴ In the event, these expectations were frustrated: too few jobs were created to permit a significant transfer of labour from the agricultural and tertiary sectors to industry, and most of the children of shopkeepers, artisans and smallholders were overqualified for such jobs as were available.

Disappointment about the factory complex's low employment potential also had a political dimension. Thanks to their key political role as link men between upper class politicians and the mass of the electorate, traders and artisans have generally succeeded in securing privileged access to development resources coming into the town. Thus, they - or rather their children - were disproportionately represented in the *Ajinomoto-Insud* workforce, and they have been the main beneficiaries of the *Cassa* small industrial grants scheme. In the early stages of the ENI project it seemed probable that, for artisans at least, this pattern of privilege would be repeated, if only because Vincenzo Russo, its supposed main architect, was closely associated with the Artisans' Association, whose chief officers were amongst his closest supporters in Manfredonia.⁵ But although artisans had better access to information about the factory's selection procedures than most other occupational groups in Manfredonia, the patronage resources at the disposal of their leaders were far too slight to meet the demands upon them. Understandably, many disappointed clients felt that privileged access to information about jobs was no substitute for the jobs themselves, and they vented their anger on the Association's leaders and its political sponsors, accusing them of self-interest, favouritism and corruption. Indeed, early in 1970, there was a split in the Association with a group of dissidents leaving to join a rival political faction.⁶ And even those who remained behind brought consternation to the leaders of the 'Russo' faction by openly attacking the *Macchia* decision.⁷

Yet if traders, artisans and smallholders were agreed that it would have been better if the industrial complex had been built to the south of Manfredonia, their position on the *Macchia* issue was different in emphasis from that of landowners and professionals. They took relatively little part in the anti-pollution campaign, and their concern with environmental issues and with the social costs of industrialisation only emerged when it became apparent that the ENI-ENEL schemes would fail to satisfy their job

expectations.

Furthermore, their perception of the industrial decision making process was strikingly and distinctively political. In the middle ranks of Manfredonian society (and more than at any other level) there was the firm conviction that ENI was the pliant tool of the 'Russo' faction, and its decisions were seen as part of a long-term partisan strategy whose ultimate aim was both to bolster the electoral strength of the Minister himself, and to advance the personal interests of a handful of his closest supporters. Correspondingly complaints against the company were cast in political rather than in social or economic terms: with supporters of the 'Russo' faction castigating it for furthering personal rather than faction interests; their opponents accusing it of partisan particularism.

Manual workers

As one moves down the social scale in Manfredonia the social and environment arguments against incoming industries steadily lose their impact. At this level of society many people were unfamiliar with the pollution argument,⁸ and even those who were not were inclined to treat it either as an ideological dimension of the endless struggle between upper-class politicians or, at best, as a convenient strategem for putting pressure on the factory management. Opposition to the Macchia site was not so much based on a detailed appraisal of the possible risks to public health as on the campanalistic assumption that most of the advantages of industrialisation would go to Montesantangelo.

There can be no doubt that the great majority of manual workers were favourably impressed by the prospect of industrial employment which, they believed, was far superior to anything else available in the local economy. Even the temporary jobs offered by outside contractors were more secure and better paid than casual employment in the local building industry or in agriculture.⁹ And if industrialisation involved some economic costs, such as the loss of work on the Macchia olive plantations, there were ample compensations in other directions.¹⁰ Moreover, the fact that the new industrial enterprises were state controlled was seen as an added advantage since it guaranteed security and financial stability and made it unlikely that future employees would be subject to the same blatant abuse and frauds which often face workers taken on by newly formed private industries in the South.¹¹

But if jobs in state industry were highly prized, they were also difficult to come by. And the problems encountered by manual workers in applying for posts and in seeking to understand the criteria by which the factory

recruited its labour force were the source of bitter resentment and the persistent accusation that selection procedures were time-consuming and inflexible, arbitrary and unfair. Thus migrant applicants were aggrieved at the prospect of having to relinquish jobs abroad to return to Manfredonia where they were kept waiting for medical examinations and interviews. And they found it difficult to understand why a large international organisation such as ENI was unable to process their applications abroad or at company headquarters in Milan.

An even more widespread complaint was about the apparent mystery shrouding recruitment policy, and the problem of obtaining accurate information about where to apply for jobs, and what sort of jobs were available.¹² Understandably, manual workers resented the need to seek the services of intermediaries, whose help was frequently unreliable, and whose subsequent pretensions only too often knew no bounds.¹³

Amongst manual workers the fiercest criticism of ENI's selection process was reserved for its supposed policy of favouring the 'rich and influential'. Thus, fishermen and day labourers rarely failed to point out that successful applicants generally came from families which were sufficiently well-to-do to support them in other ways. And they argued that it would have been much fairer had jobs been allocated according to social needs. What was the justification for finding jobs for people already in employment? Why prefer unmarried young men to those with family duties and responsibilities? The fallacy in this argument was, of course, that it failed to take account of the company's need for technicians and for workers young enough and sufficiently well educated to profit from specialist training programmes. But in the circumstances it was a plausible mistake.¹⁴ After all, ordinary Manfredonians had no way of knowing what ENI's labour requirements were, and their own industrial experiences abroad had typically been with industries (for example, traditional heavy industry and the construction business) characterised by a relatively low degree of occupational specialisation.

The fact that manual workers were not fully aware of the extent to which the original estimates of the employment potential of the factory complex had been cut back increased their bitterness towards the factory management. They only knew that their initial expectations had not been fulfilled: there was no immediate escape from the drudgery of agriculture, no repatriation and industrial resettlement for migrants, no quick solution to problems of unemployment and under-employment; and the fault seemed to lie squarely with ENI and ENEL who had manifestly failed to keep their promises. There was no attempt to apportion blame between the companies,

politicians and the state. For in the view of working class Manfredonians these three categories were barely distinguishable and all were held to be jointly responsible for the deficiencies of the industrial development scheme.

But despite these disappointments manual workers never lost faith in industrialisation as the most promising remedy for their main economic and social problems.¹⁵ Whatever the social costs, there was never any suggestion that the factory complex should be moved elsewhere. Even capital intensive industries were better than no industries at all. Rather against the odds, they continued to hope that other industries with a higher employment potential would be persuaded to come to Manfredonia, if necessary 'encouraged' by the same type of direct action campaign which had taken place in the methane communes.

Summary and conclusions

So far in this chapter, I have been concerned with the way in which different occupational and status groups responded to the advent of industry. I have shown that, although the Manfredonia project was criticised at all levels of society, opposition to it varied both in content and intensity, and that the criteria by which it was judged differed from one social class to another. This is most apparent if we compare the extremes of Manfredonian society. Understandably hostility was most sustained amongst landowners and professionals whose power and way of life was most directly threatened by industrialisation, and whose pragmatic attacks on the details of the ENI-ENEL scheme masked more radical and deep-seated objections. On the other hand, industrial development posed no threat at all to manual workers whose criticisms were merely aimed at improving the terms on which it was offered. And if, in the latter stages of the anti-ENI-ENEL campaign politicians sought to conceal these differences and to confront the companies with a common set of community grievances based on pollution and social costs arguments, these arguments received no more than nominal recognition in the lower reaches of Manfredonian society.

Yet if occupational status was the main determinant of attitudes to industrialisation, it was by no means the only one. Within each of the occupational groups there were pockets of dissident opinion; people whose perception of the impact of industry was markedly different from that of most of their peers. Thus some landowners and professionals were in favour of the Macchia site; not all artisans were convinced that the recruitment of the factory labour force was corrupt and unjust; and a few manual workers were impassioned conservationists. The reasons for deviant attitudes of this sort were subtle and complex and some of them were obviously the product of

personal whims, preferences and interests too varied and too idiosyncratic to be easily amenable to analysis. Others, however, can be attributed to more general causes.

One important factor governing attitudes to industrialisation, and one which cut across occupational solidarity, was *campanalismo*. As we saw in Chapter 3, a high percentage of Manfredonia's population came from Montesantangelo, and *montanari* were well represented in all occupational and professional groups. Recent immigrants, in particular those whose reference groups and most significant social ties were still predominantly located in their town of origin, used *montanari* rather than Manfredonian criteria for evaluating the industrial development project. And especially on the Macchia and pollution issues, they took a much softer line than their Manfredonian counterparts.

A second source of deviation was age, with young people generally taking a much harsher view of industry than their elders. This was most noticeable amongst students with manual or semi-manual family backgrounds, many of whom took a significant part in the anti-Macchia campaign, and who were attracted to parties such as the Republicans, ENI and ENEL's fiercest critics. This degree of radicalisation is surprising if only because, even in families which have invested in the social mobility of their children, political attitudes and affiliations tend to remain unchanged from one generation to the next; and it is perhaps best explained by the resentment and frustration felt by students at being excluded from industrial employment.

A third, and probably the most important, source of variation in intra-occupational group response to industrialisation is related to the nature of Manfredonian politics. As we saw in Chapter 4, parties seek to recruit support at all social levels, and the patron-client networks from which they are built up cut across the horizontal ties of class solidarity. Although networks of this sort have a transactional rather than a moral basis, they do provide a channel through which the ideas and attitudes of the party or faction leadership are filtered down the political system, and in this way, over time, upper-class ideologies gain acceptance amongst at least some network members at other levels of society. This is precisely what happened during the debate over the Manfredonia project. Generally speaking, the main themes of the anti-ENI-ENEL campaigns were too remote from the interests and experience of the mass of ordinary Manfredonians for them to gain widespread popular support. But within each of the major parties there was a small core of tradesmen and manual workers who fully endorsed the values and beliefs of the party leadership, and whose attitudes to industrialisation were consequently often radically different from those of their class peers.¹⁶

Taken overall, the most striking conclusion to emerge from this analysis of variations in response to industrialisation is how poorly the interests and attitudes of the lower strata of Manfredonia's society were represented in the various political campaigns against incoming industries. Recruitment, the one issue about which they were deeply concerned, was never discussed at length in public, and the repeated protests about the Macchia site and its attendant economic and environmental consequences were never of more than marginal importance to them. Throughout, the conduct of the campaigns against ENI and ENEL were directed by a narrowly based political elite, and their form and content reflected, above all, upper-class interests and preoccupations. The growing consensus of hostile opinion which emerged on the council in the latter stages of the ENEL controversy was achieved only by ignoring the strong if inarticulate undercurrent of popular support which the Manfredonia project undoubtedly enjoyed amongst the mass of the electorate. Whatever the politicians might say, opposition to the industrial development scheme was neither ubiquitous nor universal.¹⁷

Notes to Chapter 7

1. To the extent that local politicians rely on the support of provincial and national party organisations, there are external constraints as well.
2. This point is illustrated by the response of landowners and professionals to two survey questions: 'Do you believe that the petro-chemical complex will stimulate the growth of other local industries?' Yes: 36; No: 4; Don't know: 3; Total: 43. And 'What advantages if any will this have for your own occupational groups?' No advantages: 31; Some advantages: 11; Don't know: 11.
3. Many of these so-called northerners were not from North Italy at all, and some of them understood only too well the complexities of small-scale societies such as Manfredonia.
4. The children of shopkeepers, artisans and small landowners account for the major part of the vast increase in student numbers in Manfredonia over the last two decades.
5. The Artisans' Association was at both provincial and local levels one of the minister's main institutional power bases ('fiefs' in local parlance).
6. The fact that the Artisans' Association failed to extend or to consolidate its support in this period was a clear political setback for the 'Russo' faction of the DC party. In marked contrast, in Pisticci, CISL and Catholic Action, the two associations believed to be most closely

associated with the ANIC factory management, vastly increased their support (Catholic Action by about 50% and CISL from 2 to 1000 card carrying members) in the period in which the factory was recruiting workers. Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 153

7. Similar attacks were also made by the *Coltivatori Diretti*.
8. Thus, for example, most fishermen were totally unaware of the debate about whether the power station complex should be run on naphtha or methane. The leaders of the anti-pollution campaign recognised that their arguments had little impact in the lower reaches of Manfredonian society and repeatedly stressed the need to educate and to sensitise public opinion to the dangers of pollution.
9. It is, however, important to note that not all workers were clear about the distinction between temporary and permanent employment. Quite erroneously, some people believed that by accepting work with one of the contracting firms they were increasing their chances of being taken on permanently by ENI.
10. Agricultural labourers were not greatly concerned by the loss of jobs on the olive plantations. Such work is mainly carried out by women and is poorly paid. Indeed, in recent years, there has been a tendency for people to refuse work of this sort.
11. Manfredonian workers were much less enthusiastic about the development of small-scale local industries than regional or national planners, largely because their experiences with such concerns were dismal. They had an endless fund of stories about the ways in which up-and-coming entrepreneurs had cheated them out of wages, social security contributions, redundancy payments and so forth. The fact that both in formal interviews and private conversations fishermen, building workers and agricultural labourers repeatedly stressed the importance of fringe benefits in state industries is striking testimony to the remarkable change in popular attitudes towards the state which has taken place over the last two decades.
12. Although manual workers were more concerned with employment opportunities than with any other aspect of the industrial development scheme, this was the area in which they were least well informed. Thus, on the evidence of our formal interviews, less than 20% of manual workers were able to make an accurate assessment of the future ENI-ENEL workforce; no more than one-third knew the correct form of application, and hardly anyone was able to specify what criteria the companies used for selecting workers. It seems to be no coincidence that of the three main controversies between town and factory only the

recruitment issue never became the focus of an intense public debate. The reason, I suspect, is that political leaders did not wish to provoke a detailed public discussion of matters which were crucial to their own brokerage functions.

13. Thus, for example, fishermen, who because of their mode of livelihood had few opportunities to attach themselves to patron-client information networks, generally maintained that bribery was the most effective way of obtaining industrial employment. It was simpler - and in the long run probably cheaper - to pay cash for services rendered, rather than get involved in open-ended reciprocal relationships in which there was no limit to one's obligations.
14. Manfredonians tried to work out for themselves the criteria of recruitment employed by ENI by examining *ex post facto* the characteristics of successful applicants. This type of analysis confirmed their worst suspicions. The first batch of appointees were technicians, mainly from middle ranking families and (for reasons I discussed in Chapter 5) often the children of people who were politically well connected.
15. It is perhaps worth adding that these attitudes were not shared by all members of the fishing community. As we have already seen, an interesting survey finding was that between one-quarter and one-third of all the fishermen we interviewed were opposed to industrialisation. And although subsequent investigation by my research assistant inclines me to believe that this percentage is too high, I have no doubt that some fishermen (mainly small boat owners) were less than enthusiastic both about the particular ENI-ENEL project and about industrialisation in general. There were three main reasons for their opposition. First, many small boat owners were afraid that the building of a deep water port stretching out to sea for two kilometers would constitute a serious navigational hazard. Secondly, industrialisation offered fewer advantages to fishermen than to any other group of manual workers. They already had more work than they could cope with, and average wage levels were higher than those likely to be offered by industry. Thirdly, a small group of fishermen (including some with industrial experience) objected to the discipline, rhythm and routine of industrial employment, preferring the freedom of being the masters of their own boats, and the freedom to decide their own hours and patterns of work. It is, however, important to note that such attitudes, which constitute almost the only clear piece of supportive evidence for the cultural obstacles to change thesis which I encountered in Manfredonia, were highly exceptional even in the fishing community.

16. Unfortunately, in the formal survey we were not able to obtain systematic or entirely reliable information about political affiliation. For what it is worth, however, of those interviewees from whom we do have such information (about 42%) and whose attitudes to industry were significantly different from those of their class peers, almost 80% appear to have been closely associated with one of the major party organisations, usually parties of the centre or right.
17. Surprisingly, in view of the vigour with which it defended its policy in other areas, ENI failed to take advantage of potential popular support of this kind. The main reason was that, because of the nature of its public relations machinery, it was largely unaware of its existence. As we have seen, the contacts of both its factory managers and public relations officer did not penetrate much beyond a handful of the more influential members of the local political elite, who clearly had no incentive to stress the project's basic popularity.

Chapter 8

Conclusions

The Industrial Development Project - An overview

Although, when I left the field at the end of 1970, it was still too early to judge the full social and economic effects of the Manfredonia project, it was already apparent that it had failed to live up to its initial promise. The heady enthusiasm of December 1966, when the project had been launched in a blaze of publicity as the solution to the problems of the 'methane' communes, had long since evaporated, and subsequent claims that it would provide the fulcrum of a revitalised provincial industrial development policy had been substantially discredited. The truth was that it had failed to meet both the aims of provincial and national planning authorities and the hopes and expectations of the local population.

Neither ENI nor ENEL were able to play the propulsive role envisaged by Law 634 and the provincial development plan. Their operations were too self-contained, too sophisticated and too remote from the experience of the host population to have much effect on the local economy. The scope for the development of satellite industries was minimal. Both the manufacture of the complex plant and equipment needed by industries of this sort, and the processing of their various by-products, called for a level of capital investment and technological competence which local entrepreneurs could not readily supply. And their main supplies and market, and even a significant portion of their more highly skilled workers and technicians, could only be found outside the province of Foggia altogether. Similarly, the hope that state industries would provide a solution to the province's unemployment and migrant problems was totally unrealistic. If in Manfredonia and Montesantangelo alone demand for industrial employment far outstripped supply, what were the chances of success of a provincial industrial development plan which sought to create sufficient jobs to meet the ambitious threefold objective of mopping up unemployment and under-employment, of repatriating emigrants, and of transferring workers from the agricultural to the industrial sector of the economy? Despite a massive outlay of capital investment, the Manfredonia project was too small in size and scope to stimulate on any significant scale further industrial growth within the Foggian development

pole. In the wider planning context of the provincial industrial development plan, it was surely destined to fail.

The reasons for this failure were both technical and political. At the most general level, it is apparent that Italian planners were unduly optimistic about the efficacy of the regional development pole policies which they espoused. Even in circumstances much more favourable than those which obtained in Manfredonia, such policies have had, on the whole, disappointing results. Almost everywhere they have run into problems of cost effectiveness, and, in general, so called propulsive industries have had only limited success in generating sustained economic growth.¹ Indeed, the theories on which development pole policies are based have been widely criticised by development economists on the grounds that they are internally inconsistent, confused and often only tenuously related to specific planning objectives.²

A second and more specific problem facing all South Italian planning authorities was the reluctance of private companies to move into designated development areas, and their subsequent enforced reliance on state controlled industries for the bulk of their regional investment programmes. This put them at a disadvantage in two distinct ways. Firstly since the range of nationalised industries was restricted, they were typically obliged to make do with capitally intensive, highly automated, basic industries which employed little labour, and whose production and marketing processes were unrelated to existing economic activities. Secondly, thanks to their position of near monopoly, state industries were in large measure able to dictate their own terms for moving into regions. Once again the Manfredonia project provides an apt example. Thus, the petro-chemical plant was incapable of bringing about the industrial take-off hoped for by planners and the local population alike. And ENI's insistence that it would only move into a fully-fledged development pole led to the creation of a costly infrastructure which, although neatly tailored to the company's needs, was of no more than peripheral benefit to the community at large.

A third, and probably the most important reason for the failure of the Manfredonia project was the extent to which *ad hoc* political considerations were allowed to impinge on long-term planning strategies. From the outset, it was apparent that all major investment decisions had a strong political component. In general they were timed to correspond with election campaigns, and they were almost invariably made either in response of threats of political agitation or to meet the patronage need of grand electors. Secondary decisions such as the choice of factory site, the organisation of production and the recruitment of workers were less subject to outside political interference. Both ENI and ENEL were able to use their strong bargaining position

to counter political demands which they believed would threaten their own financial interests and to ensure that their activities in Manfredonia fitted into their own long-term development programmes.

But this degree of company planning co-ordination and immunity from political pressures weakened rather than strengthened the position of the local planning authorities. Faced on the one hand by incessant *impromptu* demands from their political masters, and on the other by stringent financial and technical requirements from incoming industries, they contented themselves with a purely passive role. No serious attempt was made to co-ordinate the various development inputs coming into the province, to assess the social and economic consequences of the industrial development scheme or to modify or extend it. Far from establishing the guidelines of provincial development policy, the local planning consortium merely charted its progress. And the complex provisions of Law 634 were used not to provide a framework within which to discuss and to match potential development inputs with the needs and aspirations of the local population, but as an *ex post facto* justification for decisions based on political expediency and the profit-oriented self-interest of state combines.

Although the industrial development project did not meet its own ambitious aims, it would be mistaken to condemn it as a total and absolute failure. And the standard accusations that it was no more than a costly white elephant, and that the only industries which had been persuaded to move into the province were so polluting that they would have been refused planning permission elsewhere, whilst containing an element of truth, were both overstated. As in the case of the earlier land reform programme the direct effects of the industrial development scheme were slight: a temporary reduction in unemployment, an improved infrastructure, a modest shift from agricultural to industrial employment - changes which brought some relief to a beleaguered economy, but which were on too small a scale to effect its radical transformation. But in the eyes of most of the local population such modest achievements were better than no achievements at all. Indeed, the very shortcomings of the project seemed to offer some grounds for optimism. Even if the initial investment programme failed to stimulate indigenous economic growth, the existence of a sophisticated and costly infrastructure substantially improved the odds of other state investment in the region. And if necessary these odds could be shortened still further by the resuscitation of the political campaigns which had originally led to the establishment of the Manfredonia project.

Politics and Development

One of the most interesting issues raised by the Manfredonia project was the extent to which the local population was able to take part in the decision making process. Formally such participation was guaranteed under the provisions of Law 634. In practice, as we have seen, the consultative machinery which it established never worked effectively. The provincial consortium for industrial development played only a minor role in deciding what sort of industries would come into the area and where they would be located, and anyway never fully represented the communes and pressure groups within its territorial sphere of competence. Regional planning institutions were still very much in the making, and were unable to mediate between the needs and aspirations of the local population and national planning bodies.

This lack of effective consultative machinery was especially important in the early stages of the project. Manfredonian politicians rightly complained that by the time they were fully aware of its details, all major decisions: type of industry, the size of the workforce, the location of the factories, had already been made, and that in subsequent negotiations with the factory management their bargaining position was hopelessly eroded since only minor issues remained to be discussed. Consultation they claimed, was a sham. For despite an elaborate pretence of democratic participation, decisions continued to be imposed from the centre.

Yet in assessing the extent and effectiveness of local participation in the development process, it would be misleading to focus on formal consultative procedures alone. By exploiting their own personal and party networks outside the town, Manfredonian politicians and pressure group leaders had fairly ready access to members of regional and national planning committees, and in the latter stages of the project, at least, were able to discuss regularly their aims and problems with a wide variety of industrial managers both in Manfredonia and Rome.

But dependence on informal patronage networks of this sort had many drawbacks, and was poor compensation for the absence of proper consultative procedures. First, not all political groups had equal access to key decision makers. By and large, local representatives of the main government parties had greater access than their opposition counterparts, and understandably left wing politicians felt that they were at a disadvantage in dealing with national bureaucracies and planning bodies. In Manfredonia this became especially apparent after the elections of 1969, when a Socialist Communist coalition took charge of the commune. And it lay at the heart of the Communist Party's complaint that it was excluded from the decision making

process.

Secondly, reliance on patronage tended to consolidate the position of Manfredonia's traditional political elite by allowing them to present unchallenged a version of the facts of industrialisation which more accurately represented their own class and party interests than the aims and aspirations of ordinary people. Thanks to their near monopoly of communications with industrial managers and national bureaucrats, it was difficult either to dispute their claims to power and influence, or to challenge their frequent assertions that key industrial decisions were against the interests of the community as a whole. A third, and certainly the most serious drawback resulting from dependence on a patronage-based system of access to decision makers was that it completely eroded the bargaining power of the local community. Outside politicians, officials and technocrats had no difficulty in operating a policy of divide and rule; local community leaders could do little more than react to decisions imposed upon them from above. At most they were able to secure personal privileges and concessions for their clients. Their influence on planning strategy as a whole was very slight.

This point can best be illustrated by comparing briefly the relative influence of the municipal council and ENI on regional and national planning bodies. Formally neither were represented on these bodies which were made up of planners and politicians, although both, by exploiting patronage ties, had access to individual committee members. The content and quality of their relationships with committee members were, however, radically different. Manfredonians were operating on the periphery of their effective political networks, and as the clients of clients were cast in a dependent and submissive role. At most they could hope to gain a hearing for their case: they had no way of ensuring that their views would prevail. By contrast, ENI was able to influence planning decisions in two distinct ways. First, ever since the early 1950s, it had sought to build up a following within the main government parties of the centre and the left,³ and to gain control of an important section of the national press. Since even permanent appointments to Italian planning bodies tend to be made according to patronage criteria,⁴ the corporation had fairly easy access to planning officials at all organisational levels, and was often in a position to bring very considerable pressure to bear on individual members of planning committees. Secondly, ENI was able to take advantage of the fact that both regional and national planning bodies had virtually no research facilities of their own, or support from government technical back-up services to whom they could turn for professional advice.⁵ Consequently, in evaluating the Manfredonian project, they were compelled to rely on technical data provided by the corporation itself, which could hardly have been expected to supply information inimical to its

own case.

This formidable combination of control over government placemen and monopoly of technical expertise put ENI in a strong position to influence the direction of industrial development policy. At very least it was able to safeguard its own financial interests; at best it could hope both to impose its own particular brand of industrial logic on the development process as a whole and, as in the case of Manfredonia, to modify and to refurbish local development plans to fit into long-term company aims and objectives. In either case it was more than a match for the local communities in which its factories were located, and it had little real difficulty in neutralising their criticisms and protests to higher authorities.

Taken overall, the Manfredonia project clearly illustrates the weakness of the conventional anthropological argument that patronage systems, whatever their drawbacks, provide a means whereby people at the bottom of socio-economic hierarchies can influence the outcome of decisions on which their well-being depends. The fallacy here is to confer major analytical status on a relatively minor qualifying point. Of course, in all patronage systems patrons must seek to maintain a following, and inevitably their clients will receive some benefits and privileges. Thus, during the industrial development project, some Manfredonians obtained factory jobs, contracts and other concessions through the good offices of their patrons which they would probably not have obtained on their own merits. But valuable as these were to the individuals concerned, the number of beneficiaries was small, and only a fraction of the new industrial resources coming into the commune were allocated in this way. Similarly, by exploiting their political networks in the wider society, local politicians were able to soften the effects of some of the harsher and more unpopular industrial investment decisions. But once again, their scope for action was narrowly circumscribed, since mere access to decision makers was not in itself enough to guarantee that they would have any measure of control over the outcome of key industrial decisions. In these circumstances, for the anthropologist to lay emphasis on the peripheral benefits accruing to a few favoured clients, or to insist that in charting the complex web of patron-client ties that radiate outwards from the local community he has adequately described the power structure of the society as a whole, is simply to accept at face value an elitist patronage ideology which is gradually but steadily losing conviction in the local community itself.

Obstacles to change

Throughout this study, I have sought to emphasise and to illustrate the continual process of social change in Manfredonia and its surrounding region over the last two hundred years. At the beginning of this period, the town was a close-knit and semi-closed community. The most meaningful relationships of most of its inhabitants were confined within the boundaries of the commune; their experience of the outside world limited to brief forays along the coast or into the interior in search of seasonal employment, to pirate incursions, and to occasional encounters with outside seafarers and merchants, royal troops and tax collectors. In marked contrast, by the 1970s the town was coming to assume many of the hallmarks of a modern, consumer-oriented, economy and had become increasingly drawn into the wider framework of the national economic and political system. Many of its male and an increasing number of its female citizens spent most of their adult working lives away from home; as familiar with living and working conditions in New York, Munich or Milan as with those of their own native town. And those who stayed behind were constantly reminded by press, radio and television that they were part of a greater national society.

The intervening period was punctuated by a bevy of changes and reforms which radically transformed the economic base of Manfredonian society: in agriculture, the switch from a pastoral to an arable economy and the ensuing influx of migrant labourers to meet the needs of the new, labour intensive, cereal estates; the mechanisation of agriculture after the Second World War which led to a rapid run down of the agricultural labour force; in maritime activities, the steady decline of the coastal trade in the second half of the nineteenth century and the subsequent resurgence of the fishing industry from the 1930s onwards; urban renewal and the rapid expansion of the commercial sector of the economy after the Second World War. It is only against this background of constant and sometimes dramatic change that we can judge Manfredonian attitudes to industrialisation, or evaluate the claim that Manfredonian society was basically hostile to change. As we have seen, proponents of the cultural obstacles to change thesis cast their arguments in two distinct but related forms. The first and more general charge was that as members of a stagnant and static traditional society Manfredonians were suspicious and critical of all forms of innovation: their second and commoner assertion was that there was a basic incompatibility between local belief and behaviour patterns and the aims and logic of industrial development.

The main flaw in the first of these arguments is that it lacks a sense of historical perspective. Over the last two centuries, successive generations of

Manfredonians have been obliged to reassess their economic and political behaviour, and to adjust their way of life to meet changed circumstances. Although specific social groups have sometimes opposed particular changes which they felt were contrary to their interests, there is no evidence to suggest that they were ever against innovation as such, or that they were the merely passive victims of changes imposed upon them from without. Indeed, Manfredonia's adaptation to change has been so successful and thoroughgoing that much of the social behaviour and institutions which they themselves regard as hallowed by immemorial tradition has a time-span of no more than a few generations.

The difficulty with the second argument lies in trying to establish precisely which aspects of the traditional cultural system might be supposed to have hampered the advent of industry, or its smooth running once it had been established. None of the factors which elsewhere have been associated with peasant hostility to the introduction of factory technology - family structure, honour and the role of women in the workplace, ascriptive norms and expectations, traditional work rhythms and so on - seem to have had any great force in the Manfredonian context. As we have seen, for the most part opposition was not directed at industrialisation as such, but at the details of the way in which it was implemented; and even here responses varied according to occupational position and party affiliation. Like most peasant and post-peasant societies, Manfredonia was internally ranked; different social groups had experienced radically different work conditions, career prospects and educational opportunities, and their knowledge, experience and expectations of the wider national society of which they were a part were similarly varied. In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that protest took many different forms. And it is simply not possible to point to any specific and distinctive set of peasant values to which Manfredonian opposition to the industrial development project might reasonably be attributed.

This is not, of course, to say that there was an exact match between the values of the agents and the recipients of change. In evaluating the actions of ANIC managers, townsmen persistently underestimated the importance of technology, and were only partly aware of the commercial and financial constraints within which the factory was compelled to operate. Or, to take another example, it is difficult to see how 'domestic cycle oriented' local enterprises could have been successfully fitted into the schemes of regional planners anxious to promote coordinated, long-term, industrial growth. But although factors such as these were a source of misunderstanding, tension and mutual distrust between developers and their clients, their effect on the outcome of the industrial development programme as a whole was no more than marginal.

The basic reason for Manfredonian hostility to the industrial development project was political and not cultural. Persistent factionalism, the monopoly of political office by those social classes most hostile to innovation, and a scramble for control over new patronage resources all contributed to that opposition, and lent strength to the contention of ENI's managers that the difficulties they encountered in establishing satisfactory relations with the host community were primarily due to the machinations of the local political elite. Yet, once again, it is important not to exaggerate. Upper class opposition to industrialisation was constantly held in check by the fear of losing popular electoral support; and its carefully orchestrated campaign against specific industrial decisions, although of considerable nuisance value, never seriously threatened ENI's long-term plans. Furthermore, in stressing the political dimensions of hostility to the Manfredonia project, I am in no way trying to resurrect the cultural obstacles to change thesis under a new political guise. In the Italian context at least, patronage, factionalism and elitism are not the exclusive prerogative of small peasant communities, but the hallmark of political organisations at all structural levels. The fact that people with the greatest stake in maintaining the *status quo* are the likeliest to resist change is surely a universal truism. While the form and content of protest might have varied, the ENI project would certainly have encountered similar elitist opposition whether it had been sited in Manfredonia, Ravenna or even the Shetland Isles. Although their leaders were often able to give a contrary impression, most ordinary Manfredonians were not opposed to the introduction of factory technology. Their complaint was that too little industrialisation, of the wrong sort, had come too late. And is this they were surely justified. Perhaps the most damning indictment of post-war Italian development policy is that after a quarter of a century's sustained effort in many different fields, the state is still unable to meet the basic needs and aspirations of the population. And the improvements in living standards and conditions which had undoubtedly taken place are as much, if not more, due to the endeavour, and self-sacrifice of individual peasant migrants as to the intervention of the state in the South.

Notes to Chapter 8

1. See for example Guglielmo, R. "Géographie active de l'industrie", in *La géographie active* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), pp.223-4 and also Aydalot, P. "Note sur les économies externes et quelques notions connexes", *Revue Economique*, 16, 1965.

2. For a brief critique of these theories and their application see Hansen, N.M. "Development pole theory in a regional context", *Kyklos*, 20, 1967, pp709-727.
3. The extent of this influence over the national political elite and government bodies has been the subject of great controversy. It has been variously accused of establishing placemen within the government parties, of misappropriating public funds to support the election campaign of key supporters, of dominating foreign policy, of corrupting planning bodies and of threatening to withdraw advertising revenue from newspapers and party organs which attacked its policies. Clearly, I am in no position to judge whether these accusations are true or false. What, however, does seem to me beyond doubt is the fact that ENI's senior managers have a wide range of formal and informal contacts within the upper echelons of the national bureaucracy and in government circles, and have consistently been able to mobilise the support of core groups of friends and allies both in parliament and on regional and national planning bodies.
4. LaPalombara, J. 1964; pp.278-9, 347.
5. LaPalombara, op. cit. In this classic study of Italian bureaucracy, LaPalombara argues that a lack of technical staff and data gathering facilities renders Italian bureaucracies particularly susceptible to pressure group influence, and also that new development agencies and bureaucracies are even more open to political and technical infiltration than traditional ones.

Appendix A.

Communal election results – Manfredonia 1946-1969

Year	Lists	Votes	Percent	Seats	Year	Lists	Votes	Percent	Seats
1946	SCA	5266	56.1	24	1962	PCI	6632	37.6	16
	DC	826	8.8	-		PSDI	179	1.1	-
	UQ-PLI	3300	35.1	6		Ind.	678	4.0	1
1949	SCA	5717	46.5	6	PSI	1360	8.0	3	
	LMD	6075	49.4	24	DC	6842	40.4	18	
	MSI	498	4.1	-	PLI	366	2.2	-	
1954	DC-PLI-IC	6060	-	21	MSI-PDIUM-ID	1130	6.7	2	
	PNM-ID	1298	-	5	1966	PCI	7061	37.3	15
	PCI-IS	5523	-	9		Eterogenea	1954	10.3	4
	PSI-IS	1542	-	3		PSI	1623	8.6	3
PRI-PSDI-IC	564	-	1	PSIUP		286	1.5	-	
1958	MSI	309	-	1	DC	7990	42.3	18	
	PCI	6272	40.3	17	1968	PCI	8629	41.6	13
	PRI-PSDI	247	1.6	-		PRI	874	4.2	1
PSI	1251	3.0	3	MSI-PDIUM		874	4.2	1	
1960	MSI-PNM	1476	9.5	4	PSIUP	456	2.2	-	
	PLI	1190	7.7	3	PLI	615	3.0	1	
	DC	5115	32.9	13	Eterogenea	475	2.3	1	
	PCI	6631	40.1	17	PSI	17097	8.7	3	
	PLI-PDI	1100	6.7	2	DC	6998	33.8	15	
	PSI	1228	7.4	3					
	CD	6830	41.4	17					
	MSI	729	4.4	1					

Appendix B

BETRAYAL

The Committee of Ministers for the South has approved the location of the petro-chemical plant at Macchia, thereby opening the way for ENI to destroy Manfredonia, creating a pestilential city, excluding every possibility of tourist development, stifling agriculture and fishing; and that against all logic which would have wished to see the plant located in the arid zone to the west of the city.

The mayor has deliberately prevented the council from expressing its views in time, knowing full well that only by betrayal would it be possible to sell Manfredonia's future for electoral reasons.

On the husting, this evening in Piazza Duomo, in the hope that nobody would deny his lies, the mayor has shamefully deceived us by insinuating that those who wish to safeguard the future of Macchia and of all the Gargano are working to get rid of the petro-chemical plant from Manfredonia.

This is false, and anyone who does not have a vocation for servility and falsehood knows it well.

Let us hope that the local population will express its strongest protest against this unworthy behaviour, since it can now be sure that it can no longer rely on those who have the duty, but not the courage, to defend the future.

[Translation of the text of a statement issued by the Citizens Committee against the Macchia Site on the eve of the General Elections, May, 1968.]



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